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Abstract
Luck egalitarianism provides one powerful way of defending global egalitarianism. The
basic luck egalitarian idea that persons ought not to be disadvantaged compared to
others on account of his or her bad luck seems to extend naturally to the global arena,
where random factors such as persons’ place of birth and the natural distribution of the
world’s resources do affect differentially their life chances. Yet luck egalitarianism as an
ideal, as well as its global application, has come under severe criticisms in recent debate.
My aim in this article is to restore plausibility to the luck egalitarian idea, and to suggest
how it could then provide a plausible grounding for global egalitarianism. To do this,
I will propose a more modest but also more defensible conception of luck egalitarianism
that can also strengthen the case for global distributive justice.
Keywords
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According to the doctrine known as luck egalitarianism, the purpose of an egali-
tarian distributive principle is to mitigate the influence of luck on individuals’ life
prospects. The intuitive idea here is that no one should have a poorer life prospect
simply because of his or her bad luck. On this account of why distributive equality
matters, a just distributive arrangement is one which is sensitive to the choices that
individuals make but insensitive to their good or bad luck (or circumstance).
Although I later argue for a particular form in which a distributive arrangement
ought not to reflect the vagaries of luck, what is basic to luck egalitarianism is the
distinction between persons’ good or bad luck and their choices and effort with
respect to their distributive entitlements.
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Luck egalitarianism seems to provide a relatively straightforward case for global
distributive equality. For if factors such a person’s citizenship and the natural
distribution of the earth’s wealth and resources are generally matters of luck that
nonetheless profoundly and pervasively determine her life options, then there ought
to be a global distributive principle whose point it is to ameliorate certain inequal-
ities due to such contingencies. Thus global egalitarians like Beitz and Pogge (in
some of their earlier writings), and more recently Caney and Moellendorf, have so
argued.1 Let us call the luck egalitarian case for global distributive equality ‘global
luck egalitarianism’.2
Yet the luck egalitarian ideal itself has been severely criticized in the current
literature as a fatally flawed account of why distributive equality matters. Indeed,
some opponents of global egalitarianism proceed by exposing and undermining the
luck egalitarian presumptions behind some of the common arguments for global
distributive justice.3 Any attempt at constructing an account of global luck egali-
tarianism must, therefore, first defend the luck egalitarian ideal against these crit-
icisms. My goal in this article is to restore plausibility to the luck egalitarian ideal
by addressing certain objections to it, and then to suggest how luck egalitarianism
can also provide a plausible grounding for global egalitarianism.
A wider philosophical implication of the plausibility of luck egalitarianism is
that it provides an alternative conception of equality to the idea that equality is an
‘associative obligation’. The associative obligation account of equality holds that
equality matters only amongst persons sharing a particular form of (usually polit-
ical) association. As we can easily infer from the brief description of luck egalitar-
ianism, luck egalitarianism, in contrast, takes equality to be a more basic moral
ideal, a commitment that can apply among persons quite independently of their
associative ties to each other. With regard specifically to the debate on global
justice, it is the (not always fully defended) premise that equality is an associative
obligation that applies only among persons belonging to a particular kind of polit-
ical association that provides the fuel for much of the recent objections against
global egalitarianism.4 If luck egalitarianism can be salvaged as a viable account of
why equality matters, these objections to global egalitarianism will be rendered
irrelevant.5 More generally for political theory, the plausibility of luck egalitarian-
ism will provide a rich alternative way of conceptualizing and understanding the
relevance of distributive equality as an ideal from the standpoint of justice.
No doubt other (possible and actual) objections will be left unaddressed within
the confines of this article.6 But any continuing attempt to defend luck egalitari-
anism against these other objections, and to develop it further, both in the domestic
and global settings, will be for naught if luck egalitarianism does not even get off
the ground as some (earlier) objections that I will be discussing claim. It is a nec-
essary step in the continuing development of luck egalitarianism that these seem-
ingly fatal objections are responded to if the position is to remain worth advancing.
This is the limited but I believe important scope of the present article. My aim is to
restore plausibility to the luck egalitarian ideal in both the domestic and global
settings so as to motivate its further refinement and development.
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Before beginning, let me make some comments to further specify and delineate
the subject of global egalitarian justice. An egalitarian distributive principle has the
substantive aim of regulating economic inequality between persons. It specifies the
limits to the kinds and degree of inequalities that would be admissible in a just
social order. Rawls’s difference principle, which justifies economic inequalities (in
the distribution of income and wealth) among participating members of a society
on the condition that the worst-off representative group benefits most under a given
arrangement compared to alternative arrangements, is one such example.7 An
egalitarian distributive principle is thus more demanding than what we might
call a basic needs principle. The latter enjoins the duty to help persons meet certain
defined basic needs, whereas the former demands some regulation of inequalities
between persons even when the basic needs of all relevant agents are being met. Put
another way, egalitarian distributive justice is relative or comparative in character
and it takes the comparative benchmark to be that of equal distribution from which
any departure has to be justified to those affected.8
The interesting philosophical disagreement between global egalitarians and
those who reject global egalitarianism, call them anti-global egalitarians, is there-
fore not over whether there are global duties of any kind towards strangers and
other societies, but whether these duties include a duty of regulating global eco-
nomic and social inequalities.9 Indeed, many anti-global egalitarians accept what
we may call a ‘sufficientist’ or ‘threshold’ conception of global economic justice in
the sense that they accept a global duty to help societies or persons achieve some
defined minimum standard of living. Some may define this threshold in terms of
humanitarian or basic needs (as in Nagel); others may identify this basic minimum
more robustly in terms of a society’s capacity to support well-ordered institutions
domestically (as in Rawls).10 How this living-standard threshold is to be defined is
of course hugely important within the sufficientist conception of global justice, as
well as for our understanding of what is owed to others as an absolute minimum.
But I shall leave aside discussions within the sufficientist account here. My question
is whether global justice includes an egalitarian commitment over and above a
threshold commitment (however that commitment is defined), and specifically
whether luck egalitarianism can provide the grounding for such an egalitarian
commitment.
Let me more categorically lay out the different domains of duties. (a) The first
distinction is between duties of distributive justice and humanitarian assistance.
Distributive justice has a distinct concern from that of humanitarian assistance, in
that it is concerned not just with the basic humanitarian needs of persons as such
but with the assignment of economic goods, resources or opportunities above that
which is needed for subsistence, and is addressed to persons living under a common
social order of some kind.11 The difference between these two categories of duties is
not that one (justice) is demandable and the other (assistance) is discretionary. For
our purpose, we can take both classes to be demandable duties. The difference is in
their content and objectives. (b) The second distinction is between egalitarian dis-
tributive principles and non-egalitarian distributive principles. An egalitarian
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distributive principle, as said, is comparative and takes the comparative baseline to
be that of equal distribution, departures from which have to be justified. A distrib-
utive principle without either of these features will not be egalitarian.
These remarks are meant to reflect the uncontroversial fact, for the purpose of
specifying the field of inquiry, that there is a disagreement between commentators
who hold that global justice is committed to protecting basic needs or some defined
level of standard of living for individuals (as a matter of demandable duty) but has
no distributive egalitarian commitment, on the one side, and on the other, those
who hold that global justice includes an egalitarian distributive ideal. So long as we
acknowledge the substantive differences between these different categories of
duties, nothing rides on how we label the different positions.
Why equality matters? Luck egalitarianism vs
democratic equality
As mentioned, on the luck egalitarian ideal, persons are to take responsibility for
their choices but not for their good or bad luck.12 The purpose of a distributive
commitment is to help ensure that the social and economic order of society is
arranged such that individuals, as far as is possible, are not disadvantaged or
advantaged on account of their bad or good luck but are held, as far as is possible,
responsible for their choices. Inequalities in society are acceptable when these are
due to people’s choices and effort, but not when they are due to people’s good or
bad luck. The most reasonable egalitarian distributive arrangement for a society is
that which comes closest to tracking this ideal. For convenience, I will occasionally
refer to this key ideal in luck egalitarianism as the luck/choice principle.
To better appreciate the distinctive features of luck egalitarianism, consider
an alternative account of distributive equality, which has been broadly referred
to as ‘democratic equality’.13 Democratic equality holds that the point of dis-
tributive equality is not to mitigate the effects of luck on persons’ life opportu-
nities. Rather, the aim of an egalitarian distributive principle is to ensure that
the gap between the rich and poor in society stays within the limit consistent
with the ideals of a democratic polity, and this objective is quite independent of
the luck/choice principle. A democratic society, fundamentally, is understood as
a fair system of social cooperation, and a fair system of social cooperation must
in turn honour the ideal of reciprocity. Under a fair system of social coopera-
tion, the terms of cooperation must not be those that participants in the system,
regarded as free and equal, can reasonably reject. If a social order allows for
economic inequalities between citizens that cannot be justified to the disadvan-
taged (i.e. the disadvantaged may reasonably reject their position in society),
then this social order has failed the requirement of reciprocity. In short, the
point of a distributive principle, under democratic equality, is to instantiate the
ideal of reciprocity as required in a democratic political order.14 This is how
Rawls understands his distributive commitment. The difference principle, which
aims to justify inequalities to the worst-off in society, is understood to derive
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from this commitment to reciprocity, which in turn follows from the idea of a
democratic society as a fair system of social cooperation.15
A key difference, as I see it, between these two conceptions of distributive justice
is that democratic equality takes the value of distributive equality to be derivative of
the commitment to the ideal of a democratic political order (and the ideal of social
cooperation that characterizes such an order), whereas luck egalitarianism does not
take the value of distributive equality to be derivative in this way. Unlike demo-
cratic egalitarians, for whom distributive equality matters because (to put it simply)
democracy matters, luck egalitarians take distributive equality to matter directly:
persons qua equal moral agents are entitled to an equal distribution as the default
arrangement, and that respect for equal moral agency additionally means that any
departure from this egalitarian default must not be due to the vagaries of good or
bad luck over which persons have no agential control, but only when it is due to the
(proper) expression of person’s agency.16
The debate on global justice brings to the fore one substantive normative impli-
cation of these different accounts of why equality matters. Under democratic equal-
ity, since distributive justice is derivative of the ideal of a democratic order, unless it
can be shown that the global order is a democratic social order in the appropriate
sense (or that there is some commitment to bringing such a global order about),
considerations of global distributive justice do not even arise. Indeed, political
theorists who are (staunch) egalitarians in the domestic context, but who reject
egalitarianism in the global context, tend to subscribe to some form of democratic
equality and believe that democratic equality considerations for distributive equal-
ity are specific and limited to the context of the domestic political society.17 That is,
these egalitarians do not think that democratic egalitarian considerations take hold
beyond the borders of democratic political societies.18
Luck egalitarians, in contrast, do not take the value of global distributive equal-
ity to be derivative of the ideal of democracy. For them, the fact that individuals
find their life options differently constrained by global factors and contingencies
over which they have no real control provides sufficient grounds for a global dis-
tributive commitment, the purpose of which is to ameliorate such contingent con-
straints on individuals’ lives. On their account, the necessary and sufficient reason
why distributive egalitarian justice matters domestically – namely to discount the
effects of luck on the social distribution of resources or opportunities – is not
unique and confined to the borders of political societies but obtains globally as
well. This disengagement of the value of distributive equality from the ideal of the
democratic political society offers luck egalitarians a comparatively straightfor-
ward defence of global egalitarianism. It is thus not surprising that many (but of
course not all) global egalitarians in the contemporary literature also tend to be
luck egalitarians of some stripe.19
In saying that luck egalitarians have a more straightforward argumentative strat-
egy for defending global egalitarianism, I do not imply that a global egalitarian has
to necessarily ascribe to luck egalitarianism. It is certainly possible to arrive at global
egalitarianism along democratic equality arguments, for example, by arguing that the
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global arena is or ought to be a democratic one in which considerations of reciprocity
also apply, and then extending democratic egalitarian reasoning for distributive
equality to the global setting.20 My present goal, however, is to affirm the potential
of luck egalitarianism as an alternative defence of global egalitarianism.21
Objections against luck egalitarianism
There is an attractive intuitiveness about luck egalitarianism. After all, the view
that persons are equal moral agents and this equal moral agency entails a default
egalitarian distribution, unless deviation from that default is due to proper agency,
is very plausible. Yet luck egalitarianism, its initial appeal notwithstanding, has
recently been subject to severe criticisms. I will look at two particularly well-known
and supposedly fatal sets of objections.
Morally implausible
The first is that luck egalitarianism is ‘morally implausible’, as some critics put it
(e.g. Scheﬄer), meaning by this that the luck/choice principle has morally absurd
consequences. The following scenarios are often forwarded as evidence of luck
egalitarianism’s absurdity. For one, luck egalitarians have to hold that a maker
of a bad choice who has squandered everything and consequently is in seriously
dire straits is not entitled to any social assistance.22 But this is of course morally
counter-intuitive.
As a second scenario, luck egalitarians will have to be in the absurd business of
compensating persons for all of their good and bad luck, including, for example,
providing publicly funded plastic surgery for the unlucky ugly person.23
Third, it has been said that the luck egalitarian premise seems to imply that the
person whose life is not going so well because of bad luck has a less worthy life, and
so even when luck egalitarians come to the assistance of victims of bad luck, they
hold that person in contempt.24
Wrongly asocial
The second objection is that luck egalitarianism is a mistakenly asocial account of
distributive equality. According to critics, given luck egalitarians’ fixation on mit-
igating the effects of luck on persons’ lives, and how people relate to their own good
or bad luck, they miss the social dimension of distributive equality, which is to
regulate social relations between persons. Distributive equality matters because of
the need to ensure that persons do not stand in hierarchical and oppressive rela-
tions to each other, not because of the need to limit the effects of luck as such.25
Democratic equality provides an idea of what appropriate non-oppressive and non-
hierarchical social relations should be like, and the point of distributive justice is to
ensure that no one class in society can come to dominate over another. The mit-
igation of luck is tangential to this social purpose of distributive equality.
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Related to this problem of being asocial, a further criticism can be raised, which
is that luck egalitarianism is an incomplete account of distributive justice.
Distributive justice properly understood is concerned with the background rules
of society that determine persons’ entitlements; yet the luck egalitarian principle
has only the form of a principle of redress.26 That is, the principle that persons
should be compensated for bad luck is at best only one aspect of the ideal of
distributive justice. Thus compare the luck/choice principle with Rawls’s difference
principle: the latter is not just about reallocating resources from one person to
another (as a form of compensation) but speaks to the basic design of institutions
that fundamentally determines who is to rightfully own what in the first place.
As mentioned, there are other possible objections against the luck egalitarian
ideal that a complete defence thereof will eventually have to address. But the stated
objections seem to be the most profound, for luck egalitarianism would not even
get off the ground if these objections were to stand, and any continuing attempts at
developing and refining the luck egalitarian ideal and responding to other possible
objections would be moot if the moral implausibility and asocial objections were
not first satisfactorily addressed. So it will be a step forward if there is a way of
constructing the luck egalitarian ideal so as to evade these objections. As we will
see, addressing these objections will motivate a more modest, but also more plau-
sible, account of luck egalitarianism. Specifically, I will suggest that these objec-
tions miss their mark once we properly identify the (i) limited domain of luck
egalitarians, (ii) its special site and its (iii) specific justificatory role.27
Defending luck egalitarianism
Why luck egalitarianism is not implausible
Consider, first, the allegation that luck egalitarianism is morally implausible
because it leaves the ‘victims of bad choice’ to their dire fates.28 In response,
one might say that this objection commits a category mistake of a sort. The
mistake is that it attributes to luck egalitarianism a much wider domain of oper-
ation than luck egalitarians should claim or need to claim. It should be recog-
nized that the luck/choice principle is not meant to determine moral agents’
rightful social entitlements across the whole of morality, or even the entire
domain of social justice, but is designed specifically to apply only within the
subdomain of distributive justice. The luck/choice principle, that is, is meant to
determine how goods or resources (or some other appropriate metric of distrib-
utive equality) are to be distributed among persons participating in an ongoing
productive social order beyond that which they need for living a minimally decent
human life. (A productive society in which all members’ basic needs are met will
still have to decide how to justly distribute additional resources among its mem-
bers, and this is the question of distributive justice.) It is with respect to this
specific distributive question that the difference between luck and choice becomes
salient for luck egalitarians.
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Thus the luck/choice principle need not say anything about whether or not a
person who is about to perish is entitled to urgent social assistance, for the case
here is not that of distributive justice but the morally distinct one of basic human-
itarian assistance or human decency. In these sorts of cases, it is more straightfor-
ward to argue that a person is entitled to assistance because her humanity demands
it, or that human decency requires it, or her human rights demand it. The poor
chooser’s own past decisions can be irrelevant here. The luck/choice principle thus
need not be the right principle to apply here (or at least it shouldn’t be a decisive
principle) given that there are other competing principles that are more salient
within the moral domain of basic needs, such as the basic right of persons to
minimum subsistence and so on. The luck/choice principle need not be the decisive
principle within this moral domain because it is primarily a principle for the distinct
domain of distributive justice.
So luck egalitarians can share the intuition of the objection, that a person in dire
straits is entitled to social assistance her preceding choices notwithstanding, but
they reject the claim that luck egalitarianism is forced to deny this person assis-
tance. The slide to absurdity is blocked because of the plurality of moral domains
or what Nagel would call the ‘fragmentation of value’. If we understand the luck/
choice principle to be specific to the special domain of distributive justice, then it
need not force an unacceptable response in situations where other values are at
stake.29
This division of moral domains (between that of distributive justice and that of
humanitarian assistance) is neither eccentric nor arbitrary, but is in fact a com-
monly accepted idea in contemporary moral philosophy. Indeed, more relevantly
for the present discussion, it is an idea subscribed to by many democratic egalitar-
ians themselves.30 To be sure, one might insist that duties of assistance or human-
itarian assistance are duties of justice albeit different kinds of duties of justice from
duties of distributive justice. Indeed, one might even insist that duties of human-
itarian assistance are duties of distributive justice of sorts (given that distribution is
entailed even in humanitarian cases). But this is just a semantic quibble, and the
distinction between the moral domains I have invoked is not a semantic but a
substantive one. The difference between the two, to recall an earlier point, is not
that humanitarian duties are discretionary and duties of justice are demandable;
both are demandable duties.31 The difference lies in the content and objectives of
each. Call these categories of duties what we want, duties of assistance are sub-
stantively distinct from duties of distribution of an ongoing sort aimed at regulat-
ing inequalities between agents. Duties of assistance, unlike duties of distributive
justice, are sufficientist in form. My argument is that the luck/choice principle is a
fundamental principle with regard to the latter cases of duties but not the former,
regardless of how we label these types of duties.32
That distributive justice and humanitarian assistance are morally distinct moral
categories is a common presumption does not mean that it does not need further
philosophical defence. That there is a substantive difference between the category
of responsibility that is concerned with more than just the allocation of basic needs
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and the other that is concerned with securing only basic needs is uncontroversial.
What is more debatable is that these different categories of responsibilities are
independent of each other in the sense that there is no common principle that
serves to regulate both. This presumes the idea of value pluralism. I have of
course not offered a defence of value pluralism here, but am only arguing that if
value pluralism is presumed, then we can limit luck egalitarianism to the domain
of distributive justice specifically, and this can still allow us a distinctive approach
to equality. And as I will go on to suggest, there is nothing in luck egalitarianism
per se that must compel a denial of this division of moral domains.
Note that the claim that a person is entitled to rescue because human decency
demands it does not mean that she will in fact be rescued. Absolute scarcity may
mean that persons do not get what they are in principle entitled to; and in cases
where trade-offs need to be made, it is of course plausible that the relevant past
decisions of affected persons can play a deciding role in how to allocate scarce
resources. Here, we simply have a case in which a person’s principled entitlement to
basic goods is outweighed by other considerations.33 Choice can play a role in
decisions of this kind, and this is not uniquely a luck egalitarian claim but a
rather general moral stance. The central point is that, on my limited domain
view, luck egalitarians do not need to say that the imprudent person who is now
in dire straits forfeits any entitlement to social assistance as a matter of principle,
thus evading the reductio charge.
The second scenario offered against the moral plausibility of luck egalitarianism
is that it seems that it has to absurdly compensate persons for all of their (natural)
bad luck. But this worry is deflected if luck egalitarianism is understood to have an
institutional focus. Recall Rawls’s basic idea that natural facts in themselves are
neither just nor unjust, that what is just or unjust is ‘the way the basic structure of
society makes use of these natural differences and permits them to affect the social
fortune of citizens, their opportunities in life, and the actual terms of cooperation
between them’.34 That is, for Rawls, social justice is principally concerned with the
basic structure of society, that is, its main political and social institutions, and does
not deal directly with natural facts as such.
Luck egalitarians can and should affirm this clearly circumscribed and limited
subject-matter or locus of distributive justice. On this institutional view, then, what
is of concern to justice on the luck egalitarian view is the way institutions handle
natural contingencies, particularly if institutions advantage and disadvantage per-
sons solely on account of their natural fortunes or misfortunes. Thus natural facts
in themselves, such as persons’ good or bad luck per se, are neither just nor unjust
on the institutional ideal of luck egalitarianism. What is just or unjust is how social
institutions combine with these natural facts, specifically whether persons are
accorded more or fewer resources or opportunities simply because of certain
facts of nature about them. Yet this institutional focus I am attributing to luck
egalitarianism is still a distinctively luck egalitarian position: it is luck egalitarian
because it is how institutions handle matters of luck that issues a problem of justice.
Nothing in luck egalitarianism precludes the institutional approach to justice; and
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luck egalitarians can certainly take institutions to be the primary subject of justice
and retain their distinctive position on why distributive equality matters.
Adopting this institutional view of luck egalitarianism, we can easily see how the
objection, that luck egalitarians have to absurdly compensate persons for all of
their natural misfortunes, widely misses the mark. The fact that a person who finds
himself ugly and unluckily so (to invoke Anderson’s example) does not bother the
luck egalitarian so long as social institutions in society are not structured such that
this person’s ugliness is translated into actual social disadvantages for him. If,
counterfactually, society is such that ugly persons are indeed disadvantaged
(either through deliberate institutional design or because of widespread personal
prejudices) with respect to the background institutions of society, this would rightly
exercise the luck egalitarians (and either institutional reforms in the case of unjust
institutions or corrective and counteracting institutional measures in the case of
widespread personal discrimination will be called for). But, again, this is not
because natural bad luck per se poses a problem of justice, but because in this
case, a mere contingency has been handled by institutions in such a way as to
generate a real social disadvantage for the unlucky person.
This institutional understanding of luck egalitarianism also provides a decisive
response to the allegation that luck egalitarians are disrespectful or contemptuous
of the unlucky. Focusing on institutions, the question becomes not how (un)worthy
or pitiful a person’s life is, but whether the social order is according to an individual
her proper entitlement. Luck egalitarians are moved to act when the institutions of
society are ordered such that some persons obtain a lesser share simply because of
some arbitrary facts, not because they think the lives of these persons are poorer
and hence they are to be given charitable hand-outs, but because they have not
been given their rightful share from the beginning. As equal moral agents, persons
are entitled not to be exposed to an institutional arrangement that disadvantages
some and advantages others on account of their bad and good luck respectively.
Distributive commitments within luck egalitarianism, in particular distributive
commitments to correct for institutional failings of this sort, are due to the ideal
of the moral equality of persons. And this is a mark of respect for persons, rather
than of contempt and disrespect.
The institutional approach will allow for inequalities due to personal choices
and activities within the rules of just institutions. No doubt how individuals fare
will also depend on how others relate to them within the rules of institutions, and
these matters can be subject to luck. But from an institutional approach to justice,
these do not raise concerns of justice so long as the background institutions are
indeed just and the effects of personal decisions and actions do not undermine this
background justice. On the institutional luck egalitarian view, even if the unattrac-
tive person encounters certain personal difficulties in life, this does not raise a
matter of justice unless institutions were organized such as to disadvantage him.
Notice that the claim here is not that luck egalitarianism provides a reason for
adopting the institutional approach; the claim is that luck egalitarianism can accept
the institutional approach and can still remain distinctively luck egalitarian
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(compared to say democratic equality). This site limitation is not arbitrary if there
are independent reasons for taking on an institutional approach to distributive
justice. That is, if it is accepted that justice is concerned with institutional arrange-
ments and that issues of justice arise only among persons who are systematically
interacting in some ways, the field of inquiry is already specified, and there is
nothing arbitrary about limiting the luck/choice principle to just these sorts of
social circumstances. Understood as a claim about distributive justice, it is natural
to say that the luck/choice principle comes into play when the circumstances of
justice obtain.
One might object that it is inconsistent with the basic ideals of luck egalitarian-
ism to limit the luck/choice principles to institutions in the way I have. The thought
here would be that since the luck/choice principle holds that we ought to mitigate
the effects of bad luck on persons and hold them accountable only for their choices,
there is something amiss in limiting the principle only to institutions. The problem
with this objection is that it presumes that the luck/choice principle is a basic moral
principle that applies across the whole of morality. But this is of course just a
presumption about the moral scope of luck egalitarianism, one that is not any
more definitive than my presumption that the luck/choice principle covers only
institutional settings. There is no default understanding of luck egalitarianism. If
one begins with the rejection of value pluralism, holding that there is a single
dominant moral principle for the whole of morality, and if one affirms luck egal-
itarianism as that principle, then, sure, it would be arbitrary to limit the luck/choice
principle to institutions without further explanation, and to the extent that this
limitation runs against the basic luck egalitarian ideal understood as a general
moral ideal, then, yes, that would be inconsistent. But if one begins, instead,
from the presumption of value pluralism, and the idea that distributive justice is
a distinctive moral domain and that distributive justice is institutional in the sense
I have described, then if one also subscribes to luck/egalitarianism as an account of
distributive justice, one necessarily limits the luck/choice principle to institutional
settings. This would be neither arbitrary nor inconsistent. In short, I am attempting
to defend the plausibility of conceiving luck egalitarianism strictly as an institu-
tional principle of distributive justice. This more modest luck egalitarian approach
denies what the objection simply asserts – that luck egalitarianism should have
broader application.
Why luck egalitarianism is not asocial
Let us move to the second class of objections, namely that luck egalitarianism is a
mistakenly asocial account of distributive justice. The institutional focus outlined
would also suggest a rebuttal to this charge. An institutional approach to justice is
specifically concerned with the social order against which individuals interact and
relate to each other, and therefore is by definition a social account of justice. Luck
egalitarianism is not an asocial alternative to equality but an interpretation of what
social equality is. For luck egalitarians, the ideal of social equality between persons
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requires that a distributive arrangement that individuals collectively support does
not track the various forms of good and bad luck of individuals but only their
choice and effort. Specifically, they hold that common institutional arrangements
among persons who regard themselves as social equals must not be such as to
transform the contingencies of natural facts about them into actual social advan-
tages or disadvantages. This is part of what it means to be in a relationship of
equality with fellow members of a social order on this view. So it is not correct for
democratic egalitarians to say that luck egalitarians have a mistakenly asocial
account of distributive justice – rather they interpret what social equality is differ-
ently from democratic egalitarians. Democratic egalitarians may of course reject
this interpretation of what social equality entails, but this is different from the
blanket charge that luck egalitarians do not have a social account of equality.
The luck egalitarian interest in background institutions also suggests that it is too
hasty to think that luck egalitarianism is only a principle of redress and not really a
principle of distributive justice.35 In virtue of its institutional focus, luck egalitari-
anism is indeed concerned with how the basic political, social and economic
institutions of society combine to determine persons’ fundamental economic enti-
tlements. Its luck/choice principle is not simply a principle of redress whose basic
role is to reassign resources from the lucky to the less lucky against a fixed back-
ground institutional order that has determined who owns what, but is a principle
whose role it is to determine how that background order should be regulated. Put
another way, luck egalitarianism provides a principle for the social order that per-
sons may collectively impose on each other, not just a principle for how persons are
to relate to each other within the rules of a given social order EX POST FACTO.
A further reply to the charge that luck egalitarianism is simply about redistri-
bution and not distributive justice is available once the specific justificatory purpose
of luck egalitarianism is clarified. Luck egalitarianism is meant as a response to the
question ‘Why does equality matter?’. How equality is to matter, what the currency
of equality is and so on are matters (hugely important ones of course) that will have
to be further worked out. The objection that luck egalitarianism is an incomplete
account of distributive justice because it has only the form of a principle of redress
thus mistakenly treats luck egalitarianism as a substantive theory of equality when
it is meant to ground a commitment to equality. In a way, then, this objection also
commits a category mistake – it treats a grounding principle of equality (that is, a
principle designed to explain why equality matters) as if it were a substantive
principle of equality (that is, as a principle that explains how the commitment to
equality is to be best realized), and then goes on to show how that principle falls
short as a substantive principle. But if luck egalitarianism is not a substantive
principle of distributive justice, then it must not be evaluated as such. That it
has the appearance of a principle of redress is only due to a misunderstanding of
what it is meant to do, which is to provide a motivating ground for distributive
equality. To recap, it only says: distributive egalitarian commitments matter
because persons qua equal moral agents should not be disadvantaged by institu-
tional arrangements solely because of bad luck; it does not by itself say what the
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implemented distributive principle or principles should look like. It provides the
grounding reason why distributive equality matters, but what this further entails
would have to be worked out and the implemented substantive distributive
principle need not be identical to the luck/choice principle itself.
The appropriate comparison for the luck/choice principle is not with, say,
Rawls’s difference principle (and in this case, the luck/choice principle will
appear radically incomplete) but the principle of democratic equality. Luck egal-
itarianism is not presented as an alternative to the difference principle, but to the
latter’s grounding principle, namely the principle of democratic equality. Like the
principle of democratic equality, the question luck egalitarianism is addressing is
this: why do distributive egalitarian commitments matter? And just as democratic
equality in itself does not offer a stance on what distributive equality substantively
requires of society, nor should we expect this of the luck/choice principle.
It seems to me that understanding this very specific role of luck egalitarianism,
that is, that it is meant to motivate the commitment to distributive equality and
does not by itself specify what that commitment entails, provides a tidy way of
understanding why Rawls is not a luck egalitarian, common interpretation to the
contrary. The view that Rawls is a luck egalitarian is perhaps understandable given
Rawls’s own allusions to how justice should discount the effects of certain kinds of
arbitrary contingencies.36 Rawls famously notes distributive shares should not be
determined by factors that ‘are arbitrary from a moral point of view’ such as the
distribution of natural talents among persons.37 Indeed, this and similar remarks
by Rawls have led some commentators into thinking that Rawls is a luck egalitar-
ian of sorts.38 Yet, as we saw, Rawls has also made statements supporting demo-
cratic equality. My account of the limited justificatory role of luck egalitarianism
provides a way of reconciling these apparently conflicting remarks, and of showing
why Rawls is not strictly a luck egalitarian, his references to arbitrariness and
contingencies notwithstanding. As some of these remarks show, some notion of
the difference between choice and circumstance is invoked by Rawls in his working
out of the requirements of distributive egalitarianism, that is, in showing how the
demands of distributive equality are to be substantively expressed once we accept
that we have such a commitment. But the reason why we have such a commitment
is not because of the goal of mitigating the effects of luck on persons’ life prospects
but because of the ideal of democratic reciprocity. So, in as far as luck egalitari-
anism should be read specifically as an account of why equality matters, Rawls is
not a luck egalitarian because the luck/choice distinction does not motivate the
commitment to equality, even though in working out what equality requires, once
that commitment is motivated, Rawls has to invoke the luck/choice distinction in
some form.
In sum, the objections that luck egalitarianism is morally implausible and that it
is a wrongly asocial account of why distributive equality matters stem from three
conceptual mistakes: (i) that of attributing to it a much larger operational domain
than it needs to claim; (ii) the failure to appreciate its institutional focus; and
(iii) that of treating its luck/choice principle meant as a motivating or grounding
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principle for distributive equality as a substantive distributive principle. Once the
contours of luck egalitarianism are specified in the way I have suggested, we can see
that it is neither morally implausible nor wrongly asocial.
Institutional luck egalitarianism
My account of luck egalitarianism no doubt departs from some dominant accounts
by proposing a more modest conception of the luck egalitarian ideal. It treats luck
egalitarianism explicitly not as a doctrine about the whole of justice, let alone the
whole of morality, but as a explanation for why distributive equality matters, that
is, strictly as an explanation for why economic and social inequalities between
persons ought to be mitigated by some distributive principle.39 Moreover, luck
egalitarianism does not by itself offer a substantive distributive principle or an
account of the currency of equality; rather its purpose is to provide a justificatory
basis for why there must be some distributive commitments among individuals.
That is, it is strictly a response to the question as to why distributive equality is of
value, and is not in itself a complete response to the questions of what and how to
distribute. Finally, luck egalitarianism can retain the institutional focus of social
justice. Thus luck egalitarians need not implausibly hold that nature is itself just or
unjust; rather, it is the way institutions translate natural facts into advantages and
disadvantages for persons that presents questions of justice for the luck egalitarian.
If a label can prove useful, call my position institutional luck egalitarianism.
Yet institutional luck egalitarianism is still distinctively a luck egalitarian posi-
tion and fundamentally different from democratic equality. First, even though it is
limited to the domain of distributive justice, within that specific domain, it takes the
luck/choice principle to be fundamental. Second, even though it takes the subject
matter of distributive justice to be social institutions rather than natural facts, it is
still a luck egalitarian position in that it holds that institutions ought not to turn
natural contingencies into social advantages or disadvantages. Finally, it offers a
very different (direct) defence of distributive equality as a value in itself as
compared with democratic equality.40
It is worth noting that my invocation of the institutional approach is not ad hoc,
that is, it is not introduced simply for the purpose of constructing an account of
luck egalitarianism capable of escaping an objection. As my reference to Rawls is
meant to suggest, the institutional approach reflects one common way of under-
standing the site of distributive justice, and my argument is only that luck egali-
tarianism can accept the institutional view of justice without abandoning its key
tenets. It so happens, as I also went on to note, adopting the institutional approach
rescues luck egalitarianism from Anderson’s charge that luck egalitarianism must
be in the absurd business of compensating persons for any of their natural bad
luck. To be sure, some luck egalitarians like Richard Arneson will insist that ‘the
natural fact that people are susceptible to disease, accident, and natural catastro-
phe’ itself does present issues of social justice.41 Yet not only must this view of
social justice be defended against the institutional approach (and admittedly this is
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a distinct and complex debate that I have not broached here), more relevantly for
our present purpose, this transinstitutional approach falls prey to Anderson’s fatal
objection without any compensating advantages over the institutional alternative.
My version of luck egalitarianism which ties natural facts to institutions preserves
the attractive central intuition of luck egalitarians, like Arneson’s, that the social
disadvantages faced by, say, the unfortunate disabled person constitute an objec-
tionable social injustice. The difference is that on my account, contra Arneson, the
locus of this injustice lies not in nature or the cosmic order but in institutions, that
is, in what institutions make of people’s disabilities. So my account, by maintaining
an institutional focus, advantageously side-steps the charge that luck egalitarians
absurdly treat the natural order as a subject of social justice, while preserving the
core intuition of luck egalitarianism, namely that persons should not be socially
disadvantaged because of bad luck.
One who affirms a more traditional luck egalitarian position might think that
my institutional approach to luck egalitarianism runs against basic intuitions that
drive luck egalitarianism. For instance, it might be objected that it is counter-
intuitive from a luck egalitarian perspective that someone who is suffering from
congenital disabilities, which is a misfortune independent of institutional influence,
is not entitled to social assistance. Now it would indeed be counter-intuitive that a
person be neglected socially if she were indeed significantly impaired by her dis-
ability. But my luck egalitarian account does not entail this conclusion because
basic humanitarian considerations kick in. Just as the luck egalitarian need not say
let the imprudent perish, so too the institutional luck egalitarian does not say let
those aﬄicted by natural misfortunes that are not institutionally derived suffer.
Society has the duty to assist persons suffering from natural disabilities on
humanitarian grounds. Luck egalitarianism, as I have argued, can allow other
considerations to come into play, especially when there are basic humanitarian
implications. In general, it is not on account of our egalitarian sensibilities that
we are moved by the suffering of the severely disabled. Rather we are moved by
more basic humanitarian ideals. Since it is humanitarian ideals that drive the
objection, the objection misfires when it is directed at an egalitarian position.
Moreover, it is easy to overlook the fact that hardships encountered by the
disabled often do have institutional influence. Institutions are so pervasive that it
can be hard to notice when they do impinge on the lives of individuals. Consider
the fact that societies tend to design their public space without considering the
needs of the disabled. Things as mundane as failure to include curb-cuts at street
crossings impose difficulties and disadvantages on disabled individuals that are
social and institutional in origin rather than purely natural. The fact that our
social world is designed with the average person in mind is itself an institutional
fact, and thus an institutional luck egalitarian approach can address many of the
problems that drive the objection that institutional luck egalitarianism fails the
disabled.
So the objection will have to be reformulated. It has to say that institutional luck
egalitarianism is counter-intuitive because it allows for certain forms of natural bad
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luck that are not so severe as to generate humanitarian responses but that are
nonetheless not due to institutional influence. But if so, the objection, as an argu-
ment from intuition, loses compulsion. For it is not so clearly counter-intuitive
that, say, a slightly myopic individual is not given extra resources from society to
compensate for her natural bad luck (which we grant is a natural disability that is
not institutionally derived). Surely, egalitarian intuitions pull in different directions
here. In other words, for the most part, the absurdity imputed by the objection is
either avoided or the absurdity does not even arise: either the natural (non-insti-
tutionally derived) disability is severe enough that it elicits humanitarian responses
(hence avoiding the absurdity), or it is not so severe in which case it is not so
obvious that the person ought to be assisted (hence the alleged absurdity need
not even arise).
Global institutions and luck
Let me now indicate how my institutional luck egalitarianism can ground the case
for global distributive equality. As mentioned earlier, unlike democratic egalitar-
ians, luck egalitarians do not need to show that there is a global basic structure that
exemplifies the ideal of social cooperation as given by the idea of a democratic
political order. That is, because they do not tie the value of equality to the ideal of
democratic reciprocity or the more basic idea of social cooperation, luck egalitar-
ians do not need to show that the global arena ideally conceived is a democratic
political order in order to make the case for some global egalitarian commitments.
What luck egalitarians need only demonstrate is that the current global distribution
of wealth and/or opportunities does not track persons’ choices and efforts but is
profoundly and pervasively distorted and influenced by the vagaries of luck.
In this vein, global luck egalitarians typically argue that contingencies such as
the natural distribution of the earth’s resources and the place of birth of persons
(which are largely matters of luck and not subject to personal choice) significantly
influence the life chances of people in the world pervasively and profoundly. But
because a just distribution of wealth and resources ought not to be influenced so
disproportionately by people’s luck, some global distributive principle is needed
to correct for this discrepancy. Hence, Beitz has argued that some redistribution
of the earth’s resources, and resource-generated wealth, is required as a matter of
justice because of the unequal and arbitrary natural distribution of the world’s
natural resources. Also Pogge has argued that, consistent with Rawls’s own con-
struction of a theory of justice (as he understands it), a global difference principle
ought to be in place. Likewise, Mollendorf has also defended the idea of global
equal opportunity along luck egalitarian lines.42
But my institutional luck egalitarianism will depart slightly from these tradi-
tional accounts in how it more unambiguously locates the site of justice. On my
account, it will not be the natural fact of earth’s distribution of resources or the fact
of person’s place of birth that is the source of injustice, but the fact that existing
social and political institutions have converted these natural and contingent facts
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into social advantages and disadvantages for people. That is, it is not just the brute
fact that someone is, say, born south of the river we conventionally refer to as Rio
Grande, or the fact that some geographical regions on earth are richer in natural
resources than others, that is a matter of justice or injustice. What is just or unjust
is how the existing global order makes use of such facts, that is, how global
institutions have converted these natural facts into actual social advantages and
disadvantages for individuals.
That a person is born south of a river is a natural geographical and biological
fact that is in itself of no consequence from the point of view of justice; after all, it is
just as natural a fact that persons can ordinarily relocate themselves. That another
geographical region is richer in natural resources is also of no consequence as a
matter of justice, if people from a less well-endowed region can simply move in.
These are simply facts of nature that in themselves are unproblematic for justice. In
a global state of nature, contingencies such as a person’s place of birth, the spread
of the earth’s resources, climatic conditions, etc. do not present issues of distribu-
tive justice. In the state of nature where there is free movement (a Hobbesian
liberty), natural facts remain natural facts and are neither just nor unjust in
themselves, and distributive egalitarian considerations need not arise.
What transforms these natural facts into matters of justice is the existence of
various kinds of global and national institutional norms, sociopolitical rules and
restrictions, such as legally enforceable borders and immigration restrictions that
limit people’s natural mobility. Also able to affect this outcome are international
legal and political norms that turn the natural territorial distribution of the earth’s
resources into actual and enforceable property holdings, or entitlements of govern-
ments of states within whose borders these resources happen to be located. Or
consider the global market and its trade rules (e.g. patent laws, free trade laws)
that restrict opportunities for people within many of their own societies as well as
outside.43 For the individual born south of Rio Grande, it is not the fact that she
was randomly born south of a geological landmark along with how the globe’s
resources are naturally distributed that presents an issue of justice: what is just or
unjust is the existence of global norms (such as those governing sovereignty,
resource ownership, territorial rights), economic practices (such as trade laws,
intellectual property rights laws) and international laws and principles (such as
those regulating movement of persons across borders) that turn such natural
facts into a significant social disadvantage for her.
But it is not just the restriction of individual movement and state territorial
ownership that turn natural facts into social advantages or disadvantages. Other
forms of global practices and norms and arrangements can have this effect: for
example, a world legal order that allows decisions to be made solely in one region
of the world or in a single country without justification to outsiders even though
these decisions could have some spill-over impact on life opportunities in another
region or other countries. It also allows for what Pogge refers to as the resource
and lending privileges. The principle of non-intervention is another example of a
global norm that has pervasive impact on persons’ life chances. No doubt this
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principle is important in limiting the tendencies of countries to wage war against
each other; but it also at the same time allows states to behave with impunity (albeit
within limits) towards their own citizens.44 Thus Moellendorf concludes that ‘the
global economy has had a substantial impact on the moral interests of persons in
virtually every corner of the world. Due to this association . . . duties of [distribu-
tive] justice exist between persons globally and not merely between compatriots.45
More examples and evidence of how the global institutional order turns natural
facts about the world and its inhabitants into advantages for some and disadvan-
tages for many more can be offered. But I hope enough has been said to illustrate
the point. Accordingly, on my global luck egalitarian account, what is unjust is a
global order that has converted brute natural facts about persons into significant
advantages for some and disadvantages for others. Persons as moral equals and
who stand to each other in relations of social equality can demand of each other,
regardless of citizenship, that any common order that they are imposing on one
another begin from the default position of equality and any departures from which
should be acceptable to those adversely affected. On the luck egalitarian view, one
who is disadvantaged under such an institutional arrangement simply because of
how that arrangement has handled matters of luck has reasonable grounds for
objecting to that arrangement. Her standing as an equal moral agent in relation
to others is not being respected.
From these remarks, it is clear that the notion of ‘institution’ I am using is rather
broad and covers not only specific and concrete legal, political and economic
arrangements but also common social practices and norms that affect persons
pervasively and profoundly. I have in mind what Rawls would call the basic struc-
ture of a society – its common political, social and economic institutions and the
norms and practices that underlie and sustain these institutions. I am claiming that
there is a global institutional order – characterized by specific institutional entities,
but also social norms and expectations, accepted practice, legal principles and
forms of economic practice – that has the effect of rendering random facts about
persons and the natural state of the world into actual social inequalities.
In short, because the global arena is not a state of nature but an arena perva-
sively governed by institutional norms, regulations and expectations, many natural
facts about the world and its inhabitants do not remain innocuously facts of
nature, but are being transformed by institutions into inequalities in life chances.
To the extent that global institutions turn brute natural facts into actual differential
distribution of opportunities or resources for persons, that is, to the extent that the
global distributive set-up does not track people’s effort and ambition but ‘myriad
forms of unlucky and lucky circumstance’,46 it is to this extent unjust. There is a
case then for a global distributive principle whose purpose is to strive for a
distributive pattern that is more choice sensitive and luck insensitive.
My global luck egalitarianism focuses on global institutions and how it handles
certain natural facts. But it is a luck egalitarian position because it holds that what
is unjust is when institutions are arranged such that the distribution of resources
and opportunities does not track persons’ effort and choice but various forms of
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good and bad luck. Crucially, unlike democratic equality, it frees considerations of
global egalitarianism from considerations of the normative character of the global
order, that is, whether it is or ought to be a democratic political order in some
sense.
In spite of my focus on institutions, it should be emphasized that my account
does not rely on institutions in the same way as democratic equality. To recall,
democratic equality takes distributive equality to matter because of the value of
democratic reciprocity that is integral to the idea of fair social cooperation. That is,
distributive equality matters only within institutional settings in which the ideal of
democracy is endorsed. For many democratic egalitarians, this limits the ideal of
distributive equality to the institutions of the state. Global luck egalitarians, on my
institutional approach, do not limit distributive justice commitments to members of
a (democratic) state, but take the fact of affective institutional arrangements to be
reason enough to care about distributive equality, whether or not this affective
arrangement is democratic in character. They take egalitarian concerns to be acti-
vated whenever there are common affective institutions among persons, regardless
of whether these institutions are based on the democratic ideal of social coopera-
tion or not.47 As Van Parijs puts it, to ‘trigger demands of global egalitarian jus-
tice . . . we need far less than a global democracy . . . It is enough to have our life
prospects significantly affected by constraints which are not natural necessities but
coercive rules on which at least some of us human beings have some grip.’48
This view does not arbitrarily hold that persons so engaged are entitled to dis-
tributive claims from each other. That a distributive egalitarian commitment arises
is due to the basic luck/choice principle as that principle is applied to social
arrangements. The principle holds that a shared social order ought not to be
designed such as to privilege some over others on account of random and unchosen
facts about persons. It voices the intuition that persons sharing a social arrange-
ment ought not to impose forms of arrangement on others that turn natural and
random facts about them into social disadvantages. To be sure the luck egalitarian
principle needs further defence; but so does the democratic egalitarian principle
that a democratic social order cannot permit inequalities that strain reciprocity.
These are different thick claims about the basis of equality and, without further
argument, neither one is more or less arbitrary than the other. My aim here has
been only to suggest that the luck egalitarian principle is not absurd, that it does
not have the results or implications normally attributed to it.
Is global luck egalitarianism absurd?
Besides offering an understanding of luck egalitarianism that can deflect the
common charges levelled against it, a special advantage of my institutional luck
egalitarianism is that it avoids a common reductio argument that more standard
global luck egalitarian positions are quite vulnerable to.
The reductio argument is usually presented as follows: should space aliens be
discovered and known to be doing more poorly than us (earthlings) because they
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inhabit a more poorly endowed planet compared to ours, luck egalitarians, so it is
charged, would demand that we take on distributive commitments towards these
aliens because it is after all a matter of bad cosmic luck that their planet is less well
stocked than ours. But, so the argument holds, this would be patently absurd; and
the standard luck egalitarian defence of global resource redistribution seems to be
forced to accept this implication.49
Now, it would of course be a different matter if the space aliens risked death due
to some episodic cosmic misfortune and, moreover, that we could without signif-
icant sacrifice do something to rescue them. In this case, it is quite plausible to
claim that earthlings do have a duty of assistance towards the aliens. But the
reductio argument does not intend to challenge this claim. A limited duty of assis-
tance is distinct from an ongoing distributive commitment for the purpose of reg-
ulating inequalities in life opportunities due to luck that is at issue here. What the
reductio argument targets is the stronger (egalitarian) conclusion that global luck
egalitarianism allegedly leads to: that any society of moral beings is immediately
burdened with ongoing distributive commitments to regulate inequality the
moment a less well-off (but still thriving) society within contact is discovered.
In defence of global luck egalitarianism against this reductio argument, it seems
to me that three responses are available. (The first two are perhaps weaker
responses and also independent of my institutional luck egalitarian view; but a
third and stronger response is available to my institutional luck approach.) The
first, and weakest, response is to deny the intuition that it would be absurd to have
distributive commitments towards space aliens who are (merely) worse-off (as
opposed to space aliens who are going to perish without our help). Opponents
of global luck egalitarians seem to take the intuition for granted, and I just want to
flag the possibility that there might be some room for debate over this.50 But this, I
will concede, is a weak response for it simply denies the intuition of anti-global luck
egalitarians by offering a counter-intuition (and not an argument).
The second, less weak, response accepts the intuition that something is amiss in
the conclusion that earthlings now have distributive commitments to the aliens, but
it clarifies and relocates the source of this misgiving. What is unacceptable is not
the fact of an additional distributive obligation to moral agents with whom we have
had no ongoing relations per se. Rather, what is unacceptable is the taking on of
this new duty of justice towards strangers in the context of multiple severe but
avoidable failures of justice at home (on earth). That is, I would hazard that many
of us who sense a tension in the claim that we can have distributive obligations to
newly discovered beings feel this way because we think it is inappropriate that we
should take on new duties of justice when we are currently failing so miserably and
avoidably at home. (Why should we take on new duties of justice abroad when
there are gross injustices that need to be corrected at home?) So what is wrong in
accepting new distributive duties to these creatures is the way we would then
appear to prioritize our duties of justice (while further neglecting those at home).
So, the first response denies the intuition altogether that it is morally absurd to
say that we can have duties of justice towards strangers with whom we have had no
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relations, and the second response accepts the intuition but brings into play the
larger background context of prevailing injustices to explain what is really wrong
with our taking on new duties. Granted these are rather weak reactions to the
reductio challenge that will need further defence. But they at least suggest that
one ought not to endorse too complacently, without more reflection, the critics’
charge that this new distributive commitment would be morally absurd.
But a third and more decisive response is available to my institutional position.
This response accepts the intuition that it would indeed be absurd for earthlings to
have to attend to the distributive claims of these space aliens, but denies that luck
egalitarians are committed to the absurd conclusion. Recall that on the institutional
luck egalitarian position (that I am proposing), natural facts are in themselves
neither just nor unjust. It is how institutions handle natural facts, whether institu-
tions turn these facts into social advantages or disadvantages for persons, that
generates questions of justice. Thus on my institutional luck egalitarian view, the
fact that a society is worse-off just because of the natural order of the universe in
itself does not pose a problem of distributive justice. Again, if events were such that
some beings would be in severe straits without assistance, there could be consid-
erations based on decency or humanity to assist them. But distributive justice is a
different matter. Just because some others have to make do with less, where the
managing with less is not life threatening or, more importantly, at odds with any
conception of human decency, does not by itself present a challenge for distributive
justice. Thus, nothing on my luck egalitarian account forces the egalitarian to say
that we can have duties of egalitarian distributive justice to newly discovered space
aliens just because they are unluckily less well-off than we are. So if we accept that it
is in fact absurd that human beings ought to take on new ongoing distributive
burdens whenever new moral agents are discovered, this is not a consequence that
my luck egalitarian position is forced into. The institutional character of my global
luck egalitarian view blocks this slide into absurdity.
So my account is not absurdly overly demanding, as the reductio argument
alleges. But, on the other hand, nor is it overly harsh. It does not say that we
have no duties whatsoever to newly discovered beings. If, for example, we need to
provide limited-term humanitarian assistance to these aliens without which they
would suffer severely, nothing on my luck egalitarian account says we couldn’t.
Indeed, my account also plausibly allows for the assisting of these aliens even if
their dire condition is due to bad choices of their own.
Now it will of course be a different story if, continuing with the space fantasy,
there are in place and in effect intergalactic institutional expectations, norms and
regulations that limit what these aliens can do to better their situation. If for
example, they are expected under this galactic institutional order not to enter
earth and exploit its resources without the consent of earthlings; or if they are
expected not to harvest resources in outer space in ways that can have negative
impact for earthlings (say they may not redirect the sun’s energy for their own
benefit). In this case, then it is not just a matter of cosmic luck that these aliens are
poorer than us but ultimately the result of how affective common institutions have
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combined with the natural fact of the universe. But for the institutional order that
they accept and that we expect them to accept, these aliens could do better (by
exploiting common resources say to our own disadvantage). Under this institution-
alized setting, where there is in place an institutional order that renders certain facts
of nature into actual disadvantages for the aliens, the luck egalitarian view would
support a distributive commitment. And this is hardly counter-intuitive.
What is really of significance is that the global order is more like the revised
fantasy just constructed than the one originally offered by the reductio argument.
What is morally significant about our world is not simply certain facts of nature,
such as the spread of natural resources, the geographical locations of people’s birth
and existence, but the fact of various global norms, regulations and expectations
that turn these natural facts into actual advantages for some and disadvantages for
many persons. Thus while I claim luck egalitarians can accept the intuition that
earthlings can have no distributive commitments towards space aliens with whom
we have no prior and ongoing interaction and relations, the situation on earth is far
from analogous to such a scenario. So accepting this intuition does nothing to
compromise the case for global egalitarianism on luck egalitarian grounds.
Is it not a matter of luck, at least to some degree, whether a social arrangement
is in fact impinging on people, one might challenge? If so, should a luck egalitarian
not be committed to alleviating luck all the way down, and not be concerned only
with institutionally derived disadvantages in the way I am suggesting? After all,
aren’t the space aliens in the example quite unlucky that we have not opted to
impose some common arrangements on them? So shouldn’t a committed luck
egalitarian take steps to correct for this instance of bad luck, and in fact be com-
mitted to establishing some shared institutional scheme with the aliens? This objec-
tion is meant to call into question the coherence of an institutional approach to
luck egalitarianism. But, in reply, the objection makes little sense: it is akin to
saying that, since whether or not the circumstances of justice obtain is a matter
of luck, luck egalitarians ought to be concerned with implementing justice even
when justice considerations do not arise. The obtaining of the circumstances of
justice is necessary (and sufficient) for introducing luck egalitarian considerations
about justice (if one were a luck egalitarian), but luck egalitarianism itself does not
define the circumstances of justice. The institutional luck egalitarian account defines
the site and conditions of justice in a particular way, and it holds that it is sufficient
that there are social arrangements that impact people’s lives for considerations for
justice to arise. Perhaps other objections can be brought to bear against the basic
idea that institutional impact is a sufficient precondition of justice. But to say that
the fact of impact itself is a matter of luck and so beginning from an institutional
perspective is not compatible with luck egalitarianism confuses the conditions that
give rise to considerations of distributive justice with what justice itself demands.
Now one might insist that the basic luck/choice principle determines the circum-
stance of justice – that considerations of justice ought to arise whenever anyone is
subject to bad luck. But as has been argued, this understanding of luck/choice
principle as a basic moral principle that applies across the moral realm is hardly
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the only or default understanding of luck egalitarianism. Indeed, as the discussion
has suggested, this is a rather implausible way of conceiving luck egalitarianism,
and hence a more modest and moderate approach is being offered here instead.
Conclusion
I have tried to argue that the luck/choice principle in luck egalitarianism is a
plausible and promising grounding principle for distributive equality. One key
claim is that it is not just natural luck itself that is a matter of justice but the
interplay between institutions and luck that generates questions of justice. And I
tried to show how this institutional luck egalitarian account can serve as a viable
basis for global egalitarianism. I have of course not shown what the substantive
global distributive principle ought to be, and a complete defence of global luck
egalitarianism will eventually have to offer such a principle (thus addressing ques-
tions of ‘what’ to distribute globally as well as ‘how’ to distribute). But my aim in
this article is to try revive luck egalitarianism as a grounding principle of equality
and of global equality specifically, and I hope to have done enough to motivate
further exploration and refinement of luck egalitarianism as a candidate account of
why global distributive equality matters.
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